Using EM Side-Channels Near a Bluetooth Server Implementation to Monitor Bit-Level Leakages in BLE Communications Channels
Dataset for figures in the publication, "Using EM Side-Channels Near a Bluetooth Server Implementation to Monitor Bit-Level Leakages in BLE Communications Channels," by V.V Iyer and J.D. Rezac (GLSVLSI 2024). The abstract for this publication is as follows: Unintentional electromagnetic (EM) emanations from general purpose embedded systems have been comprehensively studied as data recovery and monitoring tools for hardware security. While the potency of these physical side channels has been repeatedly demonstrated on embedded cryptosystems and microprocessors, limited work has been performed on judging their effectiveness in surveilling wireless communication between interconnected devices. This work uses EM side channels near a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) server to recover data received from a client. The method uses near-field EM scans to isolate on-chip locations susceptible to data leakage. At these locations, information leakage from a p-bit data value is partitioned into p bit-wise components. These components are individually and independently classified using SVMs trained on a novel side-channel metric. Only O(p^2) measurements and p bit-wise classifications are needed to identify which of the 2^p possible values has been received. The performance of the method is evaluated using the average recovery rate across bits in several unknown test data packets?a recovery rate of ? 96% was observed when the method was tested on a commercial BLE module.
Complete Metadata
| @type | dcat:Dataset |
|---|---|
| accessLevel | public |
| accrualPeriodicity | irregular |
| bureauCode |
[
"006:55"
]
|
| contactPoint |
{
"fn": "Vishnuvardhan Iyer",
"hasEmail": "mailto:vishnuvardhan.iyer@nist.gov"
}
|
| description | Dataset for figures in the publication, "Using EM Side-Channels Near a Bluetooth Server Implementation to Monitor Bit-Level Leakages in BLE Communications Channels," by V.V Iyer and J.D. Rezac (GLSVLSI 2024). The abstract for this publication is as follows: Unintentional electromagnetic (EM) emanations from general purpose embedded systems have been comprehensively studied as data recovery and monitoring tools for hardware security. While the potency of these physical side channels has been repeatedly demonstrated on embedded cryptosystems and microprocessors, limited work has been performed on judging their effectiveness in surveilling wireless communication between interconnected devices. This work uses EM side channels near a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) server to recover data received from a client. The method uses near-field EM scans to isolate on-chip locations susceptible to data leakage. At these locations, information leakage from a p-bit data value is partitioned into p bit-wise components. These components are individually and independently classified using SVMs trained on a novel side-channel metric. Only O(p^2) measurements and p bit-wise classifications are needed to identify which of the 2^p possible values has been received. The performance of the method is evaluated using the average recovery rate across bits in several unknown test data packets?a recovery rate of ? 96% was observed when the method was tested on a commercial BLE module. |
| distribution |
[
{
"title": "Figure 6d - test data with true bit 1",
"mediaType": "text/csv",
"description": "Distribution of residual functions across the 2 frequencies with the most prominent t-value. Comes from test data whose true bit is 1.",
"downloadURL": "https://data.nist.gov/od/ds/mds2-3176/Fig6d_test1.csv"
},
{
"title": "Figure 6d - training data with true bit 0",
"mediaType": "text/csv",
"description": "Distribution of residual functions across the 2 frequencies with the most prominent t-value. Comes from training data whose true bit is 0.",
"downloadURL": "https://data.nist.gov/od/ds/mds2-3176/Fig6d_train0.csv"
},
{
"title": "Figure 4c",
"mediaType": "text/csv",
"description": "EM spatial map for value with hamming weight 8 at a time instance of maximum leakage. Different columns correspond to different horizontal spatial values. Different rows correspond to different vertical spatial values.",
"downloadURL": "https://data.nist.gov/od/ds/mds2-3176/Fig4c.csv"
},
{
"title": "Figure 6a",
"mediaType": "text/csv",
"description": "Hamming weight dictionary signals. First column is frequency (MHz). Remaining columns are measured voltages (mV) for different hamming weights, and a test hamming weight, respectively.",
"downloadURL": "https://data.nist.gov/od/ds/mds2-3176/Fig6a.csv"
},
{
"title": "Figure 6b",
"mediaType": "text/csv",
"description": "Residual signals for bit 1 training. First column is frequency (MHz) and remaining are residual voltages (mV).",
"downloadURL": "https://data.nist.gov/od/ds/mds2-3176/Fig6b.csv"
},
{
"title": "Figure 4a",
"mediaType": "text/csv",
"description": "Snippet of the decode window for the write operation. First column is time (microseconds). Second column is measured leakage voltage (mV) for a signal with hamming weight 0. Third column is the same with hamming weight 8.",
"downloadURL": "https://data.nist.gov/od/ds/mds2-3176/Fig4a.csv"
},
{
"title": "Figure 4b",
"mediaType": "text/csv",
"description": "Snippet of the decode window within the leakage interval. First column is time (ns). Second column is leakage voltage (mV) for a signal with hamming weight 0. Third is the same with hamming weight 8.",
"downloadURL": "https://data.nist.gov/od/ds/mds2-3176/Fig4b.csv"
},
{
"title": "Figure 4d",
"mediaType": "text/csv",
"description": "Spatial map of information leakage. Columns indicate different horizontal spatial locations. Rows indicate different vertical spatial locations.",
"downloadURL": "https://data.nist.gov/od/ds/mds2-3176/Fig4d.csv"
},
{
"title": "Figure 6c",
"mediaType": "text/csv",
"description": "T-stat values on residual training signals. First column is frequency (MHz). Second is unitless t-stat.",
"downloadURL": "https://data.nist.gov/od/ds/mds2-3176/Fig6c.csv"
},
{
"mediaType": "text/plain",
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"mediaType": "text/csv",
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|
| identifier | ark:/88434/mds2-3176 |
| issued | 2024-05-10 |
| keyword |
[
"Near-field metrology; side-channel security; BLE communication; wireless systems;"
]
|
| landingPage | https://data.nist.gov/od/id/mds2-3176 |
| language |
[
"en"
]
|
| license | https://www.nist.gov/open/license |
| modified | 2024-05-10 00:00:00 |
| programCode |
[
"006:045"
]
|
| publisher |
{
"name": "National Institute of Standards and Technology",
"@type": "org:Organization"
}
|
| theme |
[
"Advanced Communications:Wireless (RF)",
"Information Technology:Privacy",
"Mathematics and Statistics:Image and signal processing"
]
|
| title | Using EM Side-Channels Near a Bluetooth Server Implementation to Monitor Bit-Level Leakages in BLE Communications Channels |
